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Kemner: Kemner: Personal Bankruptcy Discharge

Personal Bankruptcy Discharge and the
Myth of the Unchecked Homestead
Exemption
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently one commentator suggested that methods of approval of
discharge in modern bankruptcy law can be as arbitrary as the personalities of
the varied judges hearing the proceedings.' Thus, the line between prudent
pre-bankruptcy planning and fraudulent conveyances has become so blurred
that it may no longer exist. The Eighth Circuit recently attempted to clear at
least some of the murky waters of pre-filing bankruptcy conveyances. Critics
charge, however, that confusion remains.
The problem with planning before filing bankruptcy lies in the competing
concerns of debtors and creditors. While creditors want as much of their
debts paid as possible, debtors naturally want to preserve as much of their
property as possible. Once debtors consult attorneys and elect to declare
bankruptcy, their goal will be to shield as much of their assets as possible
from the reach of their creditors. The law balances these two conflicting
desires by using exemptions, which are categories of property beyond the
creditors' reach. Depending on the location of the debtor, exemptions may be

either state or federal in origin. The use of exemptions in pre-bankruptcy
planning becomes most controversial when debtors elect to use various
categories of state exemptions that are virtually limitless monetarily.
As the debtor's use of exemptions grows monetarily, however, many
courts find the debtor's actions closer to fraud. That gray area between wisely
using generous state exemptions and fraudulently abusing them is the topic of
this Comment. If the court finds that "the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud a creditor," transferred property within a year of filing the3
bankruptcy petition, the court will deny the debtor's request for a discharge,
perpetuating his liability. The results of a court granting or denying discharge

1. Regarding debtors in two similar cases, Judge Frank Koger remarked that "[flor
all practical purposes, there was only one difference in their bankruptcy cases, i.e., Dr.
Tveten drew the Honorable Robert J. Kressel and Dr. Johnson drew the Honorable
Gregory F. Kishel as their respective Bankruptcy Judges." Koger, Is Prefiling
EngineeringPrudentPlanningor Section 727 Fraud? (Or, When Does a Pig Become
A Hog?), 93 CoM. L.J. 465, 471 (1989).

2. See Koger, supra note 1; Hansen v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d
866 (8th Cir. 1988) (Arnold, J., concurring); Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten,

848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) (Arnold, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Tveten II].
3. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

are quite different; but predicting which facts will merit a discharge can be
difficult. Glaringly similar planning actions may yield completely opposite
results. Debtors must walk a fine line between ensuring the best possible
fresh start and completely losing their right to discharge of their debts.
In states with generous homestead exemptions, 4 lawyers should carefully
examine with their clients the possibility of paying off a homestead debt in
contemplation of bankruptcy. While the gains from paying off a homestead
debt may be great, there are some risks in such action The attorney's advice
to go through with the payment should never be given unequivocally, and
only in special circumstances.
II. THE USE OF EXEMPTIONS
The policy reasons for erasing the debts of the bankrupt individual vary.
The practice of leaving debtors with some assets is a long-defended practice
in the law.6 In the typical bankruptcy situation, sufficient assets are simply
not available to pay off the bankrupt individual's debts. The purpose behind
these exemptions is to give debtors a fresh start following the discharge of
their debts in bankruptcy. 7 While broad concepts of fairness and compassion
exist, 8 an even more basic argument for leaving debtors some assets after
bankruptcy is purely pragmatic. If debtors were forced to surrender all of
their property, the state at some point would be burdened with providing the

4. Some examples of states with generous homestead exemptions include
Minnesota, Texas, Kansas, Arkansas, Florida, Oklahoma, Iowa and Nebraska.
5. "As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt
property into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions
to which he is entitled to under the law." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
361 (1977).
6. Koger, supra note 1, at 467.

7. Other policy reasons include the following:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his
physical survival; (2) To protect the dignity and the cultural and

religious identity of the debtor; (3) To enable the debtor to
rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in the future; (4)
To protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of
impoverishment; (5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor
and his family with minimal financial support from society to the
debtor's creditors.
Resnick, PrudentPlanning or Fraudulent Transfer?, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 621
(1978).
8. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/4

2

Kemner: Kemner: Personal Bankruptcy Discharge

1991]

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

debtors' basic needs. 9 To reduce the chances of this happening, both federal
and state law provide debtors with categories of property exempt from the
claims of creditors. The law must then balance, however, the concern for
giving debtors a fresh start with the competing concern of assisting creditors
in the collection of valid debts.
When debtors transfer assets into exempt categories, unsecured creditors
are forced to share on a pro rata basis only those assets remaining after
exemptions. Thus, debtors' use of exemptions hurts primarily the unsecured
creditors. The secured creditors, on the other hand, may take their collateral
out of the estate upon lifting of the stay and treat any deficiency as an
unsecured debt.
Courts will not interpret laws as generously for debtors in bankruptcy
proceedings. While statutory exemptions may exist, their use is subject to
closer scrutiny than the use of income tax exemptions. Indeed, society may
look with envy and admiration at taxpayers whose clever use of an exemption
relieved them of nearly all their tax burden. On the other hand, society might
look with disdain upon debtors whose excessive use of a bankruptcy
exemption kept a large sum from the reach of their legitimate creditors. The
reason for this distinction probably lies in the identity of the creditor. Society
has more sympathy for a private creditor than the U.S. Treasury. Further,
since the government drafts the tax laws, perhaps it should suffer from the
ambiguities and loopholes in the laws. In any event, it is important to note
that the courts' treatment of tax exemptions differs radically from bankruptcy
exemptions.
Of all the generous state exemptions, none is more prevalent than the
homestead exemption. "The homestead exemption was a Texas creation." x"
Indeed, the original Texas homestead exemption predates the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 by nearly six decades, and even predates the statehood of Texas.

Texans viewed the homestead exemption as the next logical step after clothing
and tools of the trade exemptions." In its present form the Texas homestead
exemption is perhaps the most generous of all state homestead exemptions.'2
9. Koger, supra note 1, at 466. See also In re Ellington, 63 Bankr. 271 (Bankr.

N.D. Iowa 1986).
10. Interpretive Commentary, TEx. CONST. ANN. art. 16, § 50 (Vernon 1973).
"The earliest homestead exemption law was the Statute of January 26, 1839." Id.
11. Id.

12. The Texas homestead law states as follows:
The homestead of a family, or single adult person, shall be, and is hereby
protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the
purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due
thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements
thereon, and in this last case only when the work and material are
contracted for in writing, with the consent of both spouses, in the case of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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It is also one of the most firmly entrenched. Texans initially adopted the
exemption by statute. 3 Then, while drafting the Texas State Constitution of
1845, they Were "determined to safeguard the homestead by putting it beyond
the reach of legislators as well as creditors by incorporating an exemption
provision in the constitution.' 14 With the history that this exemption enjoys,
it becomes easier to understand why the federal government has been hesitant
to preempt it.
Texans saw the exemption as an offset to economic danger with a threefold purpose:
(1) to preserve the integrity of the family as the basic element of social
organization, and incidentally, to encourage colonization for in a frontier
society each pioneer family was of definite value to the community; (2) to
provide the debtor with a home for his family and some means to support
them and to recoup his economic losses so as to prevent the family from
becoming a burdensome charge upon the public; (3) to retain in pioneers
the feeling of freedom and sense of independence which was
deemed
15
necessary to the continued existence of democratic institutions.
The need to promote westward expansion has long since passed in the
United States. Preserving family integrity, preventing debtors from burdening
society, and instilling feelings of independence and stability in citizens,
however, are policies as worthy today as 152 years ago.
Many states followed the lead of Texas and created generous homestead
exemptions. These states are primarily located in the West, in contrast to
states with parsimonious exemptions, which are typically located in the East.

III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
The competing interests of the debtor and the creditor have evolved into
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.6 The Act reflects the interplay
between state governments and the federal government in a federalist system
because respective issues are resolved at either the state or federal levels.
Under the United States Code, for example, a state may allow the debtor

a family homestead, given in the same manner as is required in the making
a sale and conveyance of the homestead ....
TEx. CONsT. ANN. art. 16, § 50 (Vernon 1973).
13. See supra note 10.
14. Interpretive Commentary, TEx. CONsT. art. 16, § 50 (1973).
15. Id.

16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to-109(g)(2) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/4
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undergoing bankruptcy proceedings to choose either state
law exemptions or
17
the federal bankruptcy exemptions found in the Code.
The Code, in section 522(b),1 8 allows states to opt out of the federal
exemptions appearing in section 522(d), leaving only state exemptions and
federal non-bankruptcy exemptions for a state's residents. 19 More precisely,
"Congress, after creating a 'federal' exemption in the Code, deemed it

appropriate to allow each state the opportunity to 'opt out' of the exemptions

listed in section 522(d) or mandate its own exemption laws."2 Unless state
law prohibits, debtors may choose either the federal bankruptcy exemptions
of section 522(d), or state or federal non-bankruptcy exemptions, depending
on which one better suits the debtors' needs. By exercising the opt-out
provision of section 522(b)(2)(A), the state removes the section 522(d)
exemptions from the debtors' choice. Yet even if a state has opted out of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions of section 522(d), debtors "may, in accordance
with section 522(b)(2)(A) exempt property of the estate that is exempt under
federal non-bankruptcy law."'" Thus, "the authority for this 'opting-out'
statute, does not give the states the power to opt out of section 522 in its
entirety. Instead, the power is clearly limited by its language to exclude only
the federal exemptions specified in section 522(d)."'2 After some controversy regarding its constitutionality, the "opt-out" provision of the 1978 Act was
upheld.23 Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, thirty

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
Eanes v. Shepherd, 33 Bankr. 984, 987 (W.D. Va. 1983).
Id.
Id. Section 522(b) states in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding section 541 of this Title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate (1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor or under paragraph
(2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the
alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal Law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the
date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile
has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
23. In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). The court relied on
the constitutionality of state "opt out" under the Bankruptcy Act or 1898 ("Old Act")
and held that "state laws concerning the field of bankruptcy are invalid under the
Supremacy Clause only if they are inconsLitent with federal bankruptcy statutes." Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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nine states have exercised the opt-out provision, leaving debtors in those states
with only state exemptions and federal non-bankruptcy exemptions.,
It is the states, and nof the federal government, that have provided the
generous exemption categories that are the subject of the cases in this
Comment. Minnesota is one example of a state that has opted out of the5
section 522(d) exemptions and has provided generous state exemptions.2
The Minnesota provisions derive in part from its state constitution, which
provides that a "reasonableamount of property shall be exempt from sale or
seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability. The amount of such
exemption shall be determined by law."' In short, the Minnesota Legislature
can exempt by statute any property, so long as the exemption meets
Minnesota's constitutional limit of reasonableness. Once the legislature enacts
an exemption statute, it is presumed constitutional. "[A] duly enacted statute
carries with it a presumption in favor of its constitutionality and this
presumption prevails unless the party challenging a statute's constitutionality
has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that it violates a constitutional
provision. '
Some exemptions in Minnesota, however, have been struck down for lack
of reasonableness. Until recently, Minnesota had an unlimited exemption for
annuities purchased from state chartered fraternal benefit societies. "When
determining whether annuities or unmatured life insurance policies are exempt
from creditors' levy by being a 'reasonable amount,' by necessity 'reasonable
amount' must be synonymous with 'reasonable value."'" Since these two
statutory exemptions were not limited in value monetarily, 29 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that they were unconstitutional.30 The court declined to
impose its own limit, saying "[r]ather than invade the province of the
legislature by attempting to rewrite the two exemption statutes so as to
provide an objective bench mark by which the 'reasonable amount' of
at 164 (emphasis added) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971)).
24. See E. WARREN AND J.WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS,
at 26 (2d. ed. 1991).
25. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 1987) (citing Contos v. Herbst,
278 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. 1974)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v. Herbst, 444
U.S. 804 (1979) [hereinafter Tvelen 1].
28. Tveten I, 402 N.W.2d at 558.
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 subd. 11 (West 1976), provides the exemption
to fraternal benefit associations. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.39 (West 1976), provides
the exemption for life insurance.
30. The court noted that the limit need not be a fixed dollar amount, but might
even be an amount "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor." Tveten 1, 402 N.W.2d at 558.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/4
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property exemption may be ascertained, we hold 3that
both statutes violate
1
article 1, section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Exemptions may also be unconstitutional on other grounds. The
Minnesota Supreme Court declared in dictum that the Minnesota statutes
exempting state chartered fraternal organizations would fail on other grounds,
namely that support of such organizations amounted to "special legislation"
and was unconstitutional.32 The court addressed this issue in In re Tveten, 33
responding to an inquiry from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Minnesota on matters of Minnesota state law?3 This interaction
between Minnesota courts and the federal courts is a clear example of how
federalism works in the bankruptcy system. The applicability and interpretation of state exemptions lies in the hands of the respective state's judicial
system.
While the Minnesota courts have not examined the homestead exemption
under legislation analysis, they did analyze whether the exemption fulfilled the
"reasonable amount" requirement of the state constitution.35 In Minnesota
and other states, the amount of exemptible homestead property is limited by
acreage rather than dollars.36 Different acreage limits correspond to varying
geographic areas throughout the state, with the smaller limit enforced mostly
in urban areas. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld this acreage limitation
as "reasonable" within the meaning of article 1, section 2, of the Minnesota
Constitution, notwithstanding the exemption's lack of a monetary limit.37
Thus, the "reasonable amount must mean reasonable [monetary] value!'
holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Tveten simply does not
apply to the homestead exemption.
With these different exemptions operating in a federal system, an
important point is that while state courts determine exemption questions,8
federal law determines a debtor's right to a discharge.39 Once a debtor has

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 402 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1987).
34. Id.

35. Id. at 551.
36. "The homestead may include any quantity of land not exceeding 160 acres,
and not included in the laid out or platted portion of any city. If it be within the laid
out or platted portion of such place its area shall not exceed one half an acre." MINN.
STAT. ANN.

§ 510.02 (West 1986).

37. In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. 1989).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). Exempt property is "any property that is
exempt under ...State or local law that is applicable." Id.

39. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Section 727(a) lists ten examples of fraudulent
and illicit activities that preclude discharge in bankruptcy. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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transferred non-exempt assets into exempt assets, they are beyond the reach
of creditors regardless of the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding. If the
bankruptcy court denies a 'debtor's request for a discharge, however, the
debtor's personal liability remains.
Making use of bankruptcy exemptions alone will not constitute fraud.
The conversion of non-exempt property into exempt property by itself before
filing "is not fraudulent as to the creditors, and permits the debtor to make full
use of the exemptions to which he is entitled under the law."' Furthermore,
the closeness in proximity between the transfer and the filing will not
constitute fraud by itself. Courts have held that a "debtor can convert
nonexempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy., 41 The
exemptions are created by the legislatures for the benefit of debtors, and "there
is nothing fraudulent per se about making even significant use" of the
exemptions.42 While the amount of assets transferred into exemptions may
be indicia of fraud, "[u]ltimately, fixed dollar limits on the use of exemptions
must be set by the legislatures. . . . In light of the danger that judges will
fraud] on
inadvertently fix inconsistent or arbitrary limits [on what constitutes
' 43
debtor.
the
of
favor
in
err
must
we
exemptions,
statutory
the
Yet, while judge-made limits should occur infrequently, they do in fact
occur. If the limit turns out to be arbitrary, then an appellate court might find
the problem difficult to cure. Where a trial judge sets an arbitrary limit, the
appellate court would presumably want to overturn the decision. The
appellate court, however, may overturn such a decision only if it was "clearly
erroneous" on the record. This standard of review chills the effectiveness of
appellate review, and most trial court decisions stand.
Obviously it is to the debtor's advantage to convert as many non-exempt
assets as possible into an exempt category. 4 Conversion of assets from
exempt form into non-exempt form, however, will not in itself constitute
fraud. "[A]bsent extrinsic evidence of fraud, mere conversion of non-exempt
property to exempt property is not fraudulent to creditors even if motivation
behind the conversion is to place those assets beyond the reach of credi-

40. In re Ford, 53 Bankr. 444 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Ford v. Poston,
773 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1985).
41. Ford, 53 Bankr. at 448.
42. Panska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 83-4.
44. "Whether the parsimonious allowances in the Northeastern states or the
magnanimous allowances in the Southwestern states are at issue, it can substantially
benefit any debtor to 'engineer' his or her assets so that he or she may retain as much
of what he or she has that is not specifically mortgaged or pledged to some creditor."
Koger, supra note 1, at 467.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/4
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tors."45 The linchpin, then, in an approval or denial of discharge is evidence
of "intent to hinder, delay or defraud."6 "Since fraudulent intent rarely is
susceptible of direct proof, courts long have accepted extrinsic evidence of
47
fraud.n
What the court will consider as evidence of fraud is a separate issue.
While the federal courts weigh admissible evidence to determine if fraud
exists, the state courts determine the admissibility of the evidence that may be
weighed to determine fraud. 48 Minnesota has adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act ("UFCA").49 While the UFCA does not specifically
mention that the amount of the transfer is evidence of fraud, case law has
been expanded to include it. "[W]here an exemption, other than a homestead
exemption, is not limited in amount, the amount of property converted into
exempt forms and the form may be considered in determining whether
fraudulent intent exists.""
In sum, while many exemption transactions are approved by state statutes
in specific dollar amounts, those without dollar limitations (excluding
homestead) are treated differently: "[T]he Court... leaves the distinction [for
these exemptions] between permissible and impermissible claims of exemption
to each bankruptcy judge's own sense of proportion."51 An appellate judge
can only overturn this decision under the "clearly erroneous" standard.52 The
evidence on the record must indicate clear error in a judge's own sense of
proportion. Such occurrences are rare.
IV. MISSOURI AND NEIGHBORING STATES

The homestead exemptions of Missouri and surrounding states dramatically illustrate the disparity in these exemptions. Not surprisingly, the homestead
exemptions in states bordering Missouri reflect the national shift towards more
generous exemptions as one moves west. 53 As a result of this disparity,

45. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
47. Hansen v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. Compare Tveten 1, 402 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 1987) with Tveten 11, 848
F.2d at 874. While 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988) defines fraudulent activities, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on the state homestead exemption to separate value
from evidence of fraud. Tveten I, 402 N.W.2d at 556.
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.20 (West 1986).
50. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
51. Koger, supra note 1, at 465.
52. McCormick v Securities State Bank, 822 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1987); In re
Cadarette, 601 F.2d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1979).
53. See Koger, supra note 1, at 466-67.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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someone considering bankruptcy should be mindful of exemptions in other
states. Debtors who change domiciles with the appropriate cause5 4 may
monetarily expand their use' of exemptions.
Missouri falls into the category of states having meager homestead
exemptions, with an $8,000 limit.55 Of the eight sister states with which
Missouri shares its borders, Tennessee,56 Kentucky, 57 and Illinois5 8 have
similar low limit homestead exemptions, ranging from $5,000 to $7,500. On
the other'end of the range of homestead exemptions are Kansas 9 and
Iowa, 60 which have homestead exemptions limited only by acreage and not
by dollar amounts. The remaining three, Oklahoma, 6' Nebraska, 62 and
Arkansas,6 combine dollar limits with acreage limits, having monetary limits
on larger tracts of land, but only acreage limits on smaller tracts of land down
to as small as 1/4 of an acre. Once a state permits any unlimited exemption
on any tract of land, however, debtors can significantly expand the monetary
use of the homestead exemption. In the states with the smallest acreage
exemptions without monetary limits, the debtors' homestead exemptions still
54. To use that particular state's exemptions, debtors must be domiciled in a state
for 180 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, or have lived in the state whose exemptions
they wish to use longer than any other state during that 180 day period. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
55. The $8,000 limit applies to both individual and joint husband and wife filings.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.475 (1986).
56. The Tennessee homestead exemption limits single filings to $5,000, and joint
filings to $7,500. TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (1984).
57. The Kentucky exemption is $5,000 for single or joint filings. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 427.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
58. The Illinois homestead exemption is $5,000, single or joint. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1983).
59. Kansas limits its homestead by acreage to 160 acres of farmland, or one acre
of land in a city or town, including the buildings thereon. No monetary limit exists.
§ 60.2301 (1983).
60. Iowa limits its homestead by acreage to 40 acres of farmland, or 1/2 acre of
land within a city. No monetary limit exists. IOWA CODE §§ 561.1, 561.2, 561.16.
(1987).

KAN. STAT. ANN.

61. The Oklahoma homestead exemption limits a 160 acre exemption to no more
than $5,000, but has an unlimited exemption of 1/4 of an acre. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31,
§ 1, 2 (1987).

62. Nebraska limits a 160 acre homestead exemption to $10,000, but puts no limit
on the homestead that occupies no more two lots of an incorporated area. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 40-101 (1986).

63. The Arkansas homestead exemption limits farmland to 160 acres limited to
$2,500, while placing no limit on 80 acres of farmland. It limits one acre of land in
an incorporated area to $2,500, yet places no monetary limit on a 1/4 acre homestead
exemption there. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-66-210 (1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/4
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would only be limited by the amount of the most expensive houses they could
buy in the state, including the 1/4 acre of ground surrounding it. As a result,
the potential abuses in the pure acreage limit states such as Kansas and Iowa
also exist in the mixed acreage/dollar limit states such as Oklahoma, Nebraska,
and Arkansas. The only truly effective limits exist in states such as Missouri,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee, which specifically set dollar limits. Recent
support for such monetary limits exists. Judges who would support the
granting of a discharge where the debtor has made significant use of
homestead exemptions have expressed support for some type of monetary
limit.6
V. SIMILAR CASES, OPPosITE RESULTS
Of the factors that serve as extrinsic evidence of fraud, five that receive
considerable attention in a bankruptcy judge's decision are, in ascending order
of likelihood of non-discharge: "(1) Size of the amount 'engineered'; (2)
Proximity (in time) of the 'engineering' to filing; (3) Did debtor convert
secured property or newly acquired funds to acquire the exempt property; (4)
Did the 'engineering' benefit insiders of the bankrupt; [and] (5) Misleading
The category of
contacts with creditoirs during the 'engineering' process."6
66
the exemption chosen is an important factor as well.
First Texas Savings Association v. Reed (In re Reed)6 7 is an example of
the types of fraud that transform the use of exemptions into the abuse of
exemptions. It was not the mere use of the exemptions that cost Reed his
discharge, but the way in which he made conversions to utilize the exemptions. Reed converted funds into exempt assets by obtaining advances from
his alter ego corporate shell, by obtaining loans from that same corporation,
by keepingreceipts from his business deposited in a hidden bank account, and
by selling personal assets for amounts which looked suspiciously less than fair
market value.6 Had the funds that Reed converted into exempt assets been
from a different source, and not tied to deceit, then the dollar amounts of the
exemptions probably would not have made the exemptions fraudulent. 69 The
key to the finding of fraud in Reed was the source of the funds converted. 70

64. See, e.g., Tveten II, 848 F.2d 871, 878 (8th. Cir. 1988) (Arnold, J., dissenting)
(supporting a dollar limit on homestead exemptions).
65. Koger, supra note 1, at 474.
66. See generally Tveten II, 848 F.2d at 873-75.
67. 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983)
68. Id. at 988-89.
69. Id. at 991-92.
70. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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In Hanson v. FirstNationalBank in Brookings,71 the controversy in the
bankruptcy court's approval of discharge surrounded transferring assets to
insiders of the debtor, and the debtor maintaining de facto possession of the
transferred assets, the proceeds of which were invested in exemptions.
Hanson was a South Dakota farmer, who as part of his pre-bankruptcy
planning sold motor vehicles to his son who still lived at home with the

debtor.72 The transfer, however, was for fair market value.7" The debtor
also sold household goods to his brother for fair market value, yet the debtor
retained possession of these items because his brother was in Alaska.74 The
creditor charged that the Hansons, "while insolvent, committed a 'classic
badge of fraud' by transferring their property to family members and at the
same time retaining the use and enjoyment of that property."7 5 The Eighth
Circuit upheld the discharge because the transfers had been for fair market
value, and because the debtor's retaining possession of them was reasonable
under the circumstances. 76 Although the transfers were for adequate
consideration on paper, the fact that the Hansoms sold the assets to insiders
and retained possession of them had to weigh heavily on the court. Yet using
the clearly erroneous standard, the Eighth Circuit let the lower court ruling
stand.
Perhaps most interesting in Hanson is Judge Arnold's concurrence. His
concurrence essentially serves as a precursor to his strong dissent in Tveten
11,77 which is reported on the very page that his Hanson concurrence ends.
Judge Arnold pointed out that Hanson merely used his exemptions wisely,78
then went on to analyze the upcoming case, Tveten H.
Much of the significance of Tveten H lies in its relation to another recent
bankruptcy case decided by the Eighth Circuit, Panuska v. Johnson (In re
Johnson).79

Moreover, the bankruptcy attorney's task of distinguishing

between prudent pre-filing planning and fraud will be accomplished, if it
indeed can be, by comparing case examples. Johnson and Tveten II provide
especially fertile ground for comparison in that the two debtors were
acquaintances, both were doctors who lost money in the same investment, and
both chose the same bankruptcy attorney. Much to Tveten's dismay, the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id.
848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).

78. Hanson, 848 F.2d at 870.

79. 880 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1989).
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similarities ended there, as Johnson was granted discharge' ° and Tveten was
not.81

A. Norwest Bank Nebraska, NA. v. Tveten
Tveten chose not to make use of the homestead exemption. With the
help of the same attorney as Johnson, Tveten planned his Chapter 11 filing by
converting non-exempt property into exempt categories. Unlike Johnson, he
liquidated his home along with most of his non-exempt assets82 and converted them into two exemption categories: life insurance, and annuities purchased
from state chartered fraternal organizations 8
These conversions totaled
nearly $700,000.8' The trustee contended that these transfers amounted to
fraud. The bankruptcy court held that even if the exemptions were permissible, Tveten had abused the protection permitted a debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code and denied him discharge. 5 Using the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, both the Federal Court for the District of Minnesota and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's
denial of discharge.86 Technically, in Tveten II the amount converted served
as indicia of fraud, which in turn led to denial of Tveten's discharge. The
amount converted, however, might have been a non-issue but for the
exemption category utilized. In any event, the dissent argued strongly that the
87
amount Tveten converted into unlimited exemptions was legally irrelevant.

80. Id. at 83-4.
81. Tveten II, 848 F.2d at 872.
82. Id. at 872-73. In seventeen separate transfers, Tveten put his assets into
exempt status. One of the assets he liquidated was his family home. Id.
83. The exemption for fraternal organizations is found in MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 550.37(11) (West 1986).
84. Tveten II, 848 F.2d at 872.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 876-77.
87. While Judge Arnold dissented in Tvelen I1, he addressed this issue of the
amount of Tveten's onversion in his concurring opinion in the prior case, Hanson.
Judge Arnold said that "as far as I can tell, [all the differences between Tveten and
Hanson, including the amounts converted] are legally irrelevant." Hanson, 848 F.2d
at 870 (Arnold, J., concurring).
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B. Panuska v. Johnson
The facts surrounding Johnson are relatively simple. Robert J. Johnson
was a Minnesota physician who invested in Growth Ventures, Inc. ("GVI"),
a real estate enterprise that eventually went sour.' Although GVI enjoyed
corporate status, Johnson became personally liable to its creditors after he
personally guaranteed GVI's indebtedness.8 9 When his creditors obtained
judgments against him, Johnson consulted a bankruptcy attorney and began
converting his non-exempt property into property that qualified under
Minnesota law as exempt, beyond the reach of his creditors.' Johnson took
advantage of four categories of exempt property: musical instruments, 9' life
insurance,92 annuities received from fraternal organizations, 93 and the
homestead exemption. 94 More specifically, he paid off $175,000 in debts
secured against his $285,000 home, set up a nearly $250,000 retirement
accofint, invested $4,000 in life insurance, and bought $8,000 worth of
musical instruments. 95 The rest of his assets were submitted for liquidation
under Chapter 7' on January 24, 1986. 9'

Panuska, the bankruptcy trustee, argued that Johnson was barred from
discharge, alleging that Johnson's transfers were intended "to hinder, delay or
defraud his creditors."9 8 The trial court approved Johnson's pre-filing
conversion of nearly $400,000 in assets into property exempt from the claims
of his creditors. 99 The trustee appealed the decision to the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota, which affirmed the decision.100
The trustee then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Relying on the clearly erroneous standard, the Eighth Circuit affirmed

88. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 79.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(2) (West 1986).
92. Id. § 550.39.
93. Id. § 550.37(11).
94. Id. § 510.01
95. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 79.
96. The difference of Johnson electing Chapter 7 and Tveten electing Chapter 11
is unimportant in this analysis. "The proscription against discharging a debtor with
fraudulent intent in a Chapter 7 proceeding is equally applicable against a debtor
applying for a Chapter 11 discharge." Tvelen II, 848 F.2d at 874.
97. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 79.

98. Id.
99. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987),
aff'd, 101 Bankr. 997 (D. Minn. 1988), remanded, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989).

100. Id.
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the discharge. 1"' That court held that: (1) the debtor's conversion of
property into homestead property did not establish fraud; and (2) a remand
was required for a determination of whether conversion of property into
musical instruments and life insurance to take advantage of Minnesota
exemptions was fraudulent. 02
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the Minnesota homestead exemption is
most significant. Johnson paid off $175,000 of his homestead debt. While
the next step in analyzing most Minnesota exemptions would be whether the
monetary value of the exemption constituted fraud, such was not the case with
Johnson's homestead exemption. The court held that the amount of property
converted into the homestead exemption could not be considered as evidence
of fraud; however, with other exemptions the amount converted could be
considered as separate indicia of fraud absent other traditional evidence.' 0 3
The court went on to find that no such traditional extrinsic evidence of fraud
existed on the record regarding the $175,000 transfer, and therefore upheld the
transfer."°
The Eighth Circuit respected the Minnesota Supreme Court's value
analysis of Tveten I, and repeated the policy reasons behind exemptions.
Since the statute limits the amount of exemption by acreage, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that this satisfies the "reasonable amount" requirement
in the state constitution. Even though the homestead exemption carries no
monetary limit as Tveten I requires for other exemptions, the Eighth Circuit
honored Minnesota's valueless requirement.'0 5 The court also noted Minnesota's16 strong social policy favoring the homestead exemption. After
Minnesota upheld the exemption, the Eighth Circuit merely had to decide
whether it would "choose to invade a prerogative [of providing exemptions]
bestowed on the states by Congress."0 7 The court reasoned that "since no
exemption is more central to the legitimate aims of state law makers than a
homestead exemption... [the value analysis] in Tveten I does not apply to
traditional homestead exemptions absent traditional evidence of fraud."'"

101. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 84.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 83.

104. Id. at 84.
105. "[N]o exemption is more central to the legitimate aims of state lawmakers
than the homestead exemption. Our support of the homestead exemption is
longstanding." Id.
106. See Title Ins. Co. of Minn. v. Agora Leases, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 884, 885
(Minn. 1982); Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 230-31, 43 N.W. 52,
53 (Minn. 1889); Cogel v. Mickow, 11 Minn. 354, 356 (Minn. 1866).
107. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 82.
108. Id. at 83.
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In short, as long as a debtor does not intentionally materially mislead a
creditor, or convey assets for less than fair market value, or retain conveyed
property for his personal use, then the debtor may transfer non-exempt assets
in any amount into a homestead. There is no requirement that the debtor
inhabit the home for any length of time after filing, nor is there any
requirement that the debtor even own the house for any length of time
preceding filing. The homestead simply must comply with the acreage
amount. 1°9

.Next, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Johnson's use of the Minnesota life
insurance and musical instrument exemptions. Regarding these two exemptions, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to "be examined for fraudulent
intent under the standards announced in Tveten

'

J.*1o

Tveten I held that

exemptions are unconstitutional insofar as they grant a value-limitless
exemption. Like the annuities and retirement exemptions Johnson used, life
insurAnce and musical instruments were also limitless. The Minnesota
Supreme Court, however, had not yet ruled these exemptions unconstitutional.
The Eighth Circuit remanded consideration of these exemptions to the trial
court to determine if the evidence of the amount Johnson exempted in these
two categories constituted fraud."'
Distinguishing Johnson from Tveten 11 is difficult. If Tveten had gotten
loans on the eve of bankruptcy, then converted the proceeds into his annuity
exemption, it is unlikely his case would have received much attention. It

stands out primarily because absent from his case were the traditional indicia
of fraud: sale for less than fair market value, falsifying of financial documents,
and retention of property allegedly conveyed. Strangely, although the cases
had similar outcomes, Reed is distinguishable from Tveten II due to the
traditional evidence of fraud in the former and its absence in the latter. Yet
it is difficult to distinguish Johnson from Tveten II, cases with opposite
outcomes. The irony regarding Johnson is that Tveten II, a case with similar
facts, had a completely opposite outcome. The court distinguished the
outcome in Johnson from that in Tveten II based primarily on the categories
of statutory exemptions. The court assumed that certain categories of
exemptions were more susceptible to fraud than others.

109. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West 1986).
110. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 84.

111. Id.
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VI. NEW TRENDS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The record of appellate courts affirming bankruptcy court decisions under
the clearly erroneous standard remained so unshakable that the Honorable

Judge Koger remarked in a 1988 article 2 that since 1978, judges in all
reported district and circuit cases had upheld the bankruptcy courts' decisions
either granting or denying a discharge. Finally, in In re Bowyer,"' a court
using the clearly erroneous standard of review overturned the decision of a
bankruptcy court, if only indirectly.
The debtor in that case, Dr. Bowyer, was a physician living beyond his
means in Austin, Texas, at the time he filed for bankruptcy on October 28,
1987. Dr. Bowyer had agreed in April of 1987 in a financing statement with
his bank, the predecessor to the creditor NCNB (the "Bank"), that he would
inform the Bank "of any material change in his financial condition.""14 In
July of 1987, Bowyer sold Canadian gold mapleleaf coins listed on his
financing statement for $18,000, but did not inform the Bank of this change
in his listed assets." 5 His wife carried the proceeds of the sale in her
purse." 6
Of this $18,000, Bowyer spent $6,000 to send his wife and her friends
to Hawaii, $4,000 on Parent's Weekend at his daughter's private school in
mid-October, and still more on household furnishings and clothes. 117
Additionally, Bowyer's wife withdrew $24,002 on October 13, 1987, from a
money market account at the Bank and used the money to satisfy their
homestead debt, utilizing what the Fifth Circuit described as a "more than
generous" Texas homestead exemption." 8
The bankruptcy court decided, and the district court affirmed, that these
actions did not prove intent to defraud creditors. On this point, the Fifth
Circuit agreed. "The bankruptcy court's finding, affirmed by the district court,
that Bowyer did not have actual intent to defraud creditors is not clearly
erroneous."" 9 Although the lower courts ruled on intent to defraud, "[t]he
bankruptcy court did not rule expressly on whether there was intent to hinder
or delay" creditors. 120 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit seized on this uncovered
point. Using the clearly erroneous standard of review, the court found that

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Koger, supra note 1, at 477-78.
916 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1058.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1059.

120. Id.
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Bowyer's activities demonstrated an intent to "hinder or delay" the creditors." The court overturned the lower courts' ruling and denied Bowyer's
discharge."'
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is noteworthy. The court noted that the
wife's keeping of the $18,000 in proceeds from the sale of the gold mapleleafs, rather than depositing them in a bank account, was "especially critical
to finding extrinsic evidence to hinder or delay."'" 3 Although the Fifth
Circuit explicitly relied on the fact that Mrs. Bowyer kept the sale proceeds
in her purse, the court indirectly indicated in at least three instances its
suspicion of the Texas homestead exemption. The court referred to the
exemption as "more than generous. " 124 Further, the Bowyers' argument that
their actions were allowable pre-bankruptcy planning "fails in light of the
spending spree and the separate satisfaction of the homestead mortgage."" s
Additionally, the court's "analysis recognizes that while some pre-bankruptcy
planning is appropriate, the wholesale expenditure of non-exempt assets on the
eve of bankruptcy (especially where there are liberal state law exemptions),
may not be."' 26 Perhaps the Fifth Circuit's repeated references to the
extreme use of the limitless homestead exemption suggest it is adopting the
"pig becomes a hog standard," and considering the amount converted into the
27
homestead, if only indirectly.1
Also noteworthy is the trend continued by the Fifth Circuit giving
deference to the bankruptcy judge's decisions under the "clearly erroneous"'02 standard of review. Using this standard, the Fifth Circuit let stand

the lower courts' rulings that Bowyer had no actual intent to defraud creditors
while engineering his bankruptcy, and that Bowyer's acts of concealment did
not render his acts fraudulent. 29 The bankruptcy court did not rule expressly on whether there was intent to hinder or delay, however, thus leaving the
121. Id. at 1060. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988) states the following: "The court
shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless- ... the debtor, with intent to hinder,delay

or defraud a creditor" has transferred assets. (emphasis added).
122. Bowyer, 916 F.2d at 1060.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1060.
126. Id.
127. Id. See In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981). Zouhar coined
the expression "when a pig becomes a hog it goes to slaughter" to indicate when a
debtor had gone so far using the exemptions that it amounted to fraud. Id. at 157.
128. "A finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
,support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), reh'g denied, 333 U.S. 869 (1948).
129. Bowyer, 916 F.2d at 1059.
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Fifth Circuit free to attack the decision without overruling the lower courts on
the clearly erroneous standard. 30 Essentially, the lack of a lower court
ruling on the specific "hinder or delay" language in section 727 afforded the
Fifth Circuit solid ground on which to base its analysis without directly
overruling a lower court or directly attacking a debtor's significant last minute
use of a homestead exemption. Apparently, however, the debtor's last minute
use of the homestead exemption, the unlimited nature of the exemption, and
the lower courts' findings of no intent to defraud still bothered the Fifth
Circuit. Yet, the court was not bothered enough to directly overturn the lower
courts' decisions as clearly erroneous. Perhaps the court was warning debtors
that if they plan to make significant use of their homestead exemptions, then
the rest of their planning had better be free from controversy.
VII. THE MYTH OF THE UNCHECKED HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

The homestead analysis, per se, is effectively inapplicable in Missouri for
individuals who declare bankruptcy in the state, as the state legislature has
placed a limit for the homestead exemption at $8,000.'
For Missourians
who change their domicile before filing for bankruptcy, however, the analysis
becomes quite important. With exemptions other than the homestead
exemption, the amount of money transferred can be independent evidence of
fraud. Yet, the distinction between exemptions is actually a fiction. The
Eighth Circuit gives great deference to the homestead exemption because of

the social policy favoring it. What, other than the statutes enacted by a
democratically elected legislature, demonstrates this "social policy"?
Presumably, a strong social policy should exist for all the exemptions the
state's legislature adopts. The purpose of every exemption is to provide the
debtor with a fresh start after bankruptcy. Has not the legislature deemed all
the exemptions equally worthy of that purpose by enacting them? If the
Minnesota legislature felt differently about various exemptions, they failed to
note those differences.
Perhaps both the Eighth Circuit and the Minnesota Supreme Court, by
labeling historically based feelings as "strong social policy," have exercised
legislative authority. The real problem with a monetarily unchecked
homestead exemption is the myth of its uniqueness. Many might agree that
a home is the necessary foundation for a debtor's fresh start. With the burden
of providing the basic need of shelter obviated, the debtor's post-bankruptcy
income is less tied up. It is naive, however, to assume that because the
history of home ownership in America is special, bankrupt debtors under the

130. Id. The Fifth Circuit went on to note that "the term 'defraud' does not
subsume 'hinder or delay'." Id.
131. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.475 (1986).
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stress of pre-filing planning will not use the homestead exemption as
feverishly as any other exemption. The potential for abuse is even more
dangerous in that the exemption is so malleable. Debtors in a pro-homestead
state need not restrict themselves to paying off their present home, from where
this social policy has its roots. On the contrary, the Eighth Circuit would let
them sell their family home, then pool their cumulative assets into a new piece
of real estate. 32
The myth of the homestead exemption, then, is that debtors will not
abuse a limitless homestead exemption in the same way they might abuse a
limitless annuity. Even in today's soft real estate market, there is little
appreciable difference between a $700,000 annuity and a $700,000 home that
debtors could later sell at their convenience. True, the home is somewhat less
liquid and the debtor may absorb some transaction costs, but these are
relatively minor factors in proportion to the home's total value. Tveten, blind
to the heretofore unannounced "strong social policy" accompanying the
homestead exemption but absent from the annuity exemption, transferred
$700,000 into exempt annuities and was eventually denied discharge. Had
Tveten foreseen Johnson, he simply could have dumped the same $700,000
into residential real estate and received his discharge. With bankruptcy
concluded, he could sell the residential real estate. At worst, Tveten might
have experienced some relatively minor transaction costs. In the end,
however, he would have ended up with an amount far closer to $700,000 than
non-dischargeable indebtedness. Further, the ironic result in Tveten 11 is
worsened because Tveten sold his own present home, lost his homestead
exemption, and converted the proceeds into exemptions which a democratically elected legislature recognized as exempt.
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the legislature gave an
unfair subsidy to state chartered fraternal organizations. 13 To this argument,
one might counter that the same unfair advantage was given to the real estate
business through the homestead exemption. Again, the court perpetuates the
myth that the uniqueness of the family home in itself will somehow prevent
bankruptcy abuses. The court in Johnson offered no support for such a
proposition.
VIII. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Consideration of paying off a homestead debt in contemplation of
bankruptcy is not limited to people in states with generous homestead
exemptions. For example, because the Missouri exemption of $8,000 per
individual (and per married couple as well) is low, Missourians could

132. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 83-4 (8th Cir. 1989).
133. Tveten I, 402 N.W.2d at 556.
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conceivably change residences before filing and move to another state. The
Code requires that for a particular state's law to apply, the debtor must have
lived in that state for the greater portion of the 180 days preceding bankruptcy
filing, or 91 days.'
For a client from a small homestead exemption state
worried about his financial position over the next few months, a move to a
state with more generous exemptions may be wise. Perhaps Missouri's
parsimonious exemption even encourages such speculation by debtors. In this
instance, a bankruptcy attorney in Missouri or a similar state would do well
to be aware of homestead exemptions in other states.
If a problem does exist with the homestead exemption, it is national in
scope. Consider solving the problem of debtors forum shopping for generous
homestead exemptions on the state level. One would approach a state
legislator in Minnesota or Texas and explain that people from around the
country with hundreds of thousands of dollars to spend want to invest it in
their state's real estate market. How could the state ever be convinced this
would be a problem?
Simple cures for the abused homestead exemption are difficult to find.
Clearly, the homestead exemption needs some check. The Minnesota acreage
limit, while constitutional, is certainly not effective. In Missouri, the $8,000
limit may well motivate individuals at risk of bankruptcy to seek greener
pastures in other states.
Most simply and fairly, a flat national dollar limit on the homestead
exemption, or at least the last minute transfers into the exemption, would cure
the problem. Whether such a change will ever take place, however, is unclear.
With the interests of states running so deep, the encroachment of the monetary
limit on state's rights may not be worth its positive effects.
Perhaps other limitations could be explored as well. Even if states with
generous exemptions decline to set a monetary limit, they might want to limit
the homestead exemption in other ways. The real myth of the unchecked
homestead exemption is that debtors will not use it as any other exemption,
and liquidate it immediately after the close of his case. One possible solution
to this problem would be in the way the bankruptcy trustee conveys the
homestead back to debtors. Instead of conveying it to debtors in fee simple
absolute, as is now done, the trustee could convey the property to the bankrupt
individuals in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. That condition
could be that the debtors use the property as their homestead for a specified
number of years, or forfeit it. This technique would preserve the debtors'
place to live and prevent the debtors from immediately converting it to cash
after bankruptcy. The duration of the conditional fee, however, would extend
the bankruptcy court's supervision of the debtor, create potential administra-

134. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1988).
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tive burdens, and prevent the "fresh start" bankruptcy seeks to achieve. Such
a solution seems impractical.
While the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent may not be
practical, requiring a debtor to have owned a home for a specific number of
years before filing bankruptcy to qualify for the exemption would promote the
ideals behind the homestead's special treatment and might justify different
value homestead exemptions for different debtors. The "feelings of personal
independence, together with love of country and kindred"'135 nurtured in a
home that some attribute as policy reasons for the homestead exemption might
not yet exist in a newly purchased home. States with generous homestead
exemptions could then place a monetary limit on the homestead exemption for
debtors who could not meet a time requirement of prior ownership. Indeed,
individuals who purchase their homes close to filing would be the debtors at
greatest risk of using the homestead as just another investment because they
have not had time to develop the emotional tie to the land as has the long
term owner. To limit the exemption's application to a home in which the
debtor has resided for a substantial period adds credence to an otherwise
amorphous exemption. This time requirement better supports the social policy
concerns.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the midst of the murky waters of pre-bankruptcy planning, some
clarity does exist. First, the monetarily unchecked homestead exemption is

subject to abuse like any other exemption, and therefore needs reform. Next,
even after Bowyer, the deference that appellate courts using the clearly
erroneous standard of review give to bankruptcy court decisions remains
strong. To a large extent, winning the first battle at the bankruptcy court level
still does mean winning the war. 36 Further, the Honorable Judge Arnold's

convincing argument that the size of the exemption claimed is legally
irrelevant 37 is not accepted, and excessive use of exemptions could turn the
pig into a hog and cost a debtor a discharge. In the eyes of the Eighth
Circuit, however, the homestead exemption is an exception. In a sense, the
homestead pig may eat to his heart's content and not worry about being
labeled as a hog. The caveat to this exception is that, if a debtor in the Fifth
Circuit elects to feast on the homestead exemption, the courts may scrutinize
his other pre-bankruptcy planning more closely.
MATIHEW J. KEMNER

135. Johnson, 880 F.2d at 83.

136. Koger, supra note 1, at 478.
137. See supra, note 87 and accompanying text.
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